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ENGAGING CAPITAL EMOTIONS 
Douglas A. Berman* and Stephanos Bibas** 
Louisiana seeks to execute Patrick Kennedy for raping his eight-year-
old stepdaughter.  As the Supreme Court weighs the death penalty for this 
child rapist, commentators are aghast.  The New York Times and the Los 
Angeles Times editorial pages call child rape a heinous horror but dismiss 
this reality.1  The death penalty, they claim, is inherently excessive for 
crimes short of homicide; visceral disgust at child rape, they assert, clouds 
reasoned reflection about proportional punishment.  This position reflects 
long-standing criticisms of the death penalty as an expression of raw venge-
ance, a hot passion that clouds dispassionate justice.  The march of justice 
seems to be in the other direction: away from emotion and towards reason, 
from Dr. McCoy to Mr. Spock, from the Furies to Athena in Aeschylus’ 
Eumenides. 
But the Furies will not die so easily, nor should we disdain them.  
Emotions and the passions they create are ever-present in our legal system.  
They bubble beneath any seemingly cool, detached analysis of crime and 
punishment.  As astute observers highlight, debates over criminal law and 
practices turn not on neutral deterrence-speak, but rather on emotion-laden 
claims and concerns.2  The undercurrents of emotion are especially salient 
in death-penalty debates.  Those who deny or bemoan the benighted persis-
tence of passion fail to appreciate its role.3 
In this short Essay, we suggest that the conventional attitude toward 
emotion in punishment is misguided.  Part I begins by describing the exist-
ing legal terrain, and then Part II evaluates it normatively.  Descriptively, 
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1
  Editorial, Not Justice: Louisiana Wants to Execute a Child Rapist.  The Crime Is Heinous, but the 
Death Penalty Is Too Harsh, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2008, at A16 (link); Editorial, The Limits of the 
Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2008, at A24 (link). 
2
  See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413, 436–51 
(1999) (noting that while death-penalty debates invoke deterrence statistics, what really influences sup-
porters and opponents is not deterrence but expressive judgments rooted in values, emotions, and sym-
pathies). 
3
  The leading anthology on the role of emotions in the law is THE PASSIONS OF LAW (Susan A. Ban-
des ed., 1999).  For a more recent exploration of the role of emotion in the death penalty generally, see 
Susan A. Bandes, The Heart Has Its Reasons: Examining the Strange Persistence of the American 
Death Penalty, 42 STUD. L., POL. & SOC’Y (forthcoming 2008). 
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emotion is unavoidable in criminal justice and particularly in capital pun-
ishment.  Indeed, recognizing emotion’s role helps to explain many features 
of capital-punishment jurisprudence, from the debate over execution meth-
ods in Baze to the exemption of juvenile and mentally retarded defendants 
in Roper and Atkins.4  Normatively, emotion is crucial to a criminal justice 
system that seeks both to educate citizens with its symbolism and to chan-
nel their justified outrage.  Emotions deserve respect, especially when they 
reflect the public’s moral perspective that certain crimes have profound 
emotional resonance. 
In this vein, Part III argues, the emotional case for the death penalty 
may be even stronger for child rape than for ordinary murders, for two rea-
sons.  The victim of a child rape ordinarily survives and has to deal with the 
emotions stirred up by victimization for the rest of her life.  Moreover, the 
victim’s parents and other members of the community may feel unique 
emotional harms from the rape of a child. 
Finally, Part IV considers how death-penalty opponents could better 
accept and harness emotional language.  Emotional arguments are more 
promising strategies for abolitionists than simply questioning death pen-
alty’s cost and deterrent effects.  The more successful foes of the death pen-
alty speak the language of the emotions.  Defense attorneys and reformers 
counter the emotional demands for justice with equally emotional pleas for 
mercy and for appreciating human fallibility.  Rather than bemoaning emo-
tional reactions, reformers should acknowledge emotion as the legitimate 
battlefield of criminal justice. 
I. THE PREVALENCE OF EMOTIONS 
The evolution of criminal law reflects the persistence of emotional 
threads.  A sudden heat of passion mitigates a killing from murder to man-
slaughter.5  The emotional fear of being battered, according to some femi-
nist scholars and defense lawyers, justifies or excuses women who kill their 
abusers.6  Hate crime laws target bigotry and disgust and combat hateful 
emotional messages.7  Insanity defenses sometimes turn on emotional ap-
 
4
  Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1533–37 (2008) (plurality opinion) (holding that three-drug method 
of lethal injection was not inherently cruel and unusual punishment); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 
569–75 (2005) (forbidding execution for crime committed while under age eighteen); Atkins v. Virginia, 
536 U.S. 304, 317–22 (2002) (forbidding execution of mentally retarded criminals). 
5
  See, e.g., Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 692–96 (1975). 
6
  See, e.g., Bechtel v. State, 840 P.2d 1, 8, 11 (Okla. Crim. App. 1992) (quoting LENORE WALKER, 
THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME (1979)) (excising reasonableness requirement from jury instruc-
tions, to allow self-defense to women who kill abusers during a lull); State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8 
(N.C. 1989); Cathryn Jo Rosen, The Excuse of Self-Defense: Correcting a Historical Accident on Behalf 
of Battered Women Who Kill, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 11, 56 (1986) (advocating self-defense excuse for bat-
tered women who kill abusers). 
7
  See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, The Progressive Appropriation of Disgust, in THE PASSIONS OF LAW 63, 
69–71 (Susan A. Bandes ed., 1999) (suggesting that hate crimes are useful tools to express disgust at 
bigotry). 
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preciation of a crime’s wrongfulness or irresistible emotional impulses to 
act.8 
The emotional topography is especially visible in enduring debates 
over capital punishment.  For starters, why do communities persist in 
spending millions of dollars pursuing, defending, and seeking to carry out 
death sentences?  Surely politicians and voters realize that years of litiga-
tion are not the most efficient way to incapacitate criminals, but efficiency 
is not the point.  Legislatures continue to champion our society’s ultimate 
punishment because elected officials and voters value the death penalty’s 
unique symbolism, solemnity, and gravity.9  Capital punishment expresses 
and educates our emotions, underscoring the solemnity of the community’s 
judgment and condemnation. 
Emotions undergird the Supreme Court’s intricate modern regulation 
of capital punishment.  The Framers wrote a seemingly emotional test into 
the Constitution: The ban on “cruel and unusual” punishments invites emo-
tional reflection on which punishments are cruel and inhumane.10  More-
over, the Justices’ extraordinary willingness to hear so many capital cases—
and often to debate issues beyond the one at hand11—suggests that even the 
nation’s top judges feel strongly about the death penalty.12 
Consideration of criminals’ emotional capacity helps to explain which 
kinds of defendants the Court has exempted from execution.  When killers 
lack emotional capacity, society cannot justify blaming them fully.  Killers 
who are mentally retarded are too irresponsible to earn our full emotional 
outrage.13  For similar reasons, Penry invalidated jury instructions that lim-
 
8
  See MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01, explanatory note (2001) (noting that the term “appreciate” in 
Model Penal Code’s insanity test is broad enough to encompass apprehending the deeper significance of 
one’s acts). 
9
  See Gregg  v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) (plurality opinion) (discussing the death penalty 
as, in part, “an expression of society’s moral outrage at particularly offensive conduct”). 
10
  U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
11
  In Kansas v. Marsh, 126 S. Ct. 2516, 2531–39, 2544–46 (2006), which evaluated capital jury in-
structions, Justices David Souter and Antonin Scalia wrote extended separate opinions to debate the fre-
quency of wrongful capital convictions.  In Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1542–56 (2008), which 
evaluated Kentucky’s lethal-injection protocol, Justices John Paul Stevens and Antonin Scalia wrote ex-
tended separate opinions to debate the basic constitutionality of the death penalty. 
12
  See generally Douglas A. Berman, A Capital Waste of Time? Examining the Supreme Court’s 
“Culture of Death” (forthcoming 2008) (noting and criticizing the Supreme Court’s tendency to devote 
a large part of its limited docket to death penalty cases). 
13
  See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318–19 (2002).  Atkins itself emphasized that mental retar-
dation impairs understanding, reasoning, communication, and impulse control.  The Court may have 
used the clinical, scientific language of mental capacity in part because it felt that courts should not 
speak the language of emotion.  But one could just as easily understand this scientific reasoning in lay 
emotional terms.  Mentally retarded killers have difficulty appreciating how badly their crimes hurt oth-
ers and educating and controlling their emotional impulses.  To that extent at least, mentally retarded 
defendants have impaired emotional capacities, and partly for that reason society is less justified in levy-
ing its full emotional outrage upon them. 
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ited juries’ ability to take full account of a killer’s mental disabilities.14  And 
Ford and Panetti forbid executing someone who is now insane.15  Executing 
an insane or mentally retarded person could further incapacitation or gen-
eral deterrence, but cannot communicate to the uncomprehending criminal 
the emotional outrage and wrongness of his deed.  The same reasoning 
helps to explain why Roper forbids executing those who killed as juve-
niles.16  Juvenile killers are not fully developed adults and so arguably are 
not proper targets of full emotional blame, even though their execution may 
incapacitate or deter. 
Notice the structure that emerges from these Eighth Amendment deci-
sions.  Judges assess offender characteristics to make sure that general 
classes of capital defendants have a constitutionally sufficient minimal level 
of emotional capacity, culpability, and comprehension.  Offenders who fail 
to meet this threshold are not proper targets of society’s emotional wrath. 
But if offenders meet the judicial threshold of emotional capacity, 
other legal actors evaluate offenders and offenses more finely and emotion-
ally.  For example, jury discretion at sentencing gives emotions a legiti-
mate, recognized role in capital punishment.  Judges exemplify 
dispassionate reason; juries, emotional judgment.  The populist jury, as the 
conscience of the community, is better able than a lone judge to sit in emo-
tional and moral judgment of a fellow human.  Legal intricacies must not 
unduly fetter jurors’ ability to tailor punishments in light of their emotional 
instincts.  Thus, Woodson invalidated mandatory death-penalty statutes that 
leave jurors no room to calibrate punishments to crimes.17  Lockett and Ed-
dings struck down laws that restricted jurors’ consideration of mitigating 
factors.18  Ring required that jurors, not judges, find defendants eligible to 
die.19  Penry guaranteed that jurors have all the information and instructions 
they need to make moral evaluations.20  And Payne stressed that juries can 
 
14
  Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 322 (1989) (requiring that jury instructions inform the jury that 
it can consider and give effect to evidence of defendant’s mental retardation and abuse, so that the jury 
may offer “‘reasoned moral response’” to mitigating evidence), abrogated on other grounds by Atkins v. 
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (banning execution of mentally retarded defendants, but not affecting 
Penry’s guarantee of jury consideration of other mental disabilities). 
15
  Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 406–10 (1986); Panetti v. Quarterman, 127 S. Ct. 2842, 2859–
63 (2007) (holding that a death-row inmate may not be executed if he lacks mental capacity to under-
stand that he is about to be executed and that this execution will be punishment for his crime). 
16
  Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570–71 (2005). 
17
  Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303–05 (1976) (plurality opinion) (forbidding manda-
tory death penalty for all first-degree murders). 
18
  Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 113–16 (1982) (requiring courts to consider offender’s un-
happy upbringing, emotional disturbance, turbulent family history, and beatings by his father as mitigat-
ing evidence in capital case); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality opinion) (holding that 
death-penalty statute must permit jury to consider all mitigating evidence relating to the defendant’s 
character, record, or offense). 
19
  Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002). 
20
  Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 322 (1989) (requiring that a jury be permitted to consider and 
give mitigating effects to evidence of defendant’s mental retardation and abuse), abrogated on other 
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hear directly from victims in order to consider the complete “emotional im-
pact” of the defendant’s crime.21 
Research shows that juries attach great weight to offenders’ emotional 
states.  A significant predictor of a death sentence is whether a killer ex-
presses remorse and seems sorry.22  Is the killer someone with normal hu-
man emotions, who feels guilt and the pangs of regret at his awful misdeed?  
Or is he a stony-hearted monster who deserves outrage, not mercy?  These 
classic jury questions drip with emotion.  Tellingly, federal judges must 
now provide clear “statement[s] of reasons” for non-capital sentences,23 but 
capital juries need not justify their sentences rationally. 
Emotion is also relevant to the kinds of crimes that legislators have 
made eligible for capital punishment.  One prominent aggravating circum-
stance asks whether a murder was heinous, atrocious, or cruel.24  These 
terms, laden with emotion, pose quintessential jury questions that are not 
readily reducible to judicial doctrines.  Another emotional extreme also 
serves as a common statutory aggravating factor: did the killer murder for 
hire?25  Legislators and jurors are aghast at the willingness of a contract kil-
ler to extinguish a human life coldly just to make a buck. 
For similar reasons, legislators allow, and jurors eagerly hear, victim 
testimony in capital cases.  Many victims desperately want their day in 
court, to vent their emotions and perhaps find closure and healing.  And ju-
rors want to know how it felt to suffer, to empathize with one side and with 
the other before rendering their moral verdict.  This lay morality is not a 
bloodless Kantian categorical imperative, but an emotional, affective judg-
ment. 
Finally, emotions have always played a role in parole and clemency 
determinations.  Like jurors, parole boards and governors typically want to 
know if offenders have admitted guilt and expressed remorse.  They also of-
ten want to hear from victims about whether they have been able to move 
on emotionally years after the crime or instead still seek and need commu-
nity vindication through punishment.  Failure to express remorse weighs 
                                                                                                                           
grounds by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (banning execution of mentally retarded defendants, 
but not affecting Penry’s guarantee of jury consideration of other mental disabilities). 
21
  Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 817 (1991) (overruling prior holdings that limited the presen-
tation of “‘victim impact’ evidence relating to the personal characteristics of the victim and the emo-
tional impact of the crimes on the victim’s family”). 
22
  Theodore Eisenberg, Stephen P. Garvey & Martin T. Wells, But Was He Sorry?  The Role of Re-
morse in Capital Sentencing, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1599, 1600 (1998).  Where jurors consider a murder 
to have been especially heinous, however, a perpetrator’s remorse likely will not influence his sentence.  
Id. 
23
  Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2468 (2007). 
24
  MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(3)(h) (2001) (specifying capital aggravating circumstance for mur-
ders that were “especially heinous, atrocious or cruel, manifesting exceptional depravity”). 
25
  See id. § 210.6(3)(g) (specifying capital aggravating circumstance for murders committed “for 
pecuniary gain”).  
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heavily against parole or pardon, and victims’ forgiveness can spur gover-
nors to grant clemency.26 
In short, capital sentencing law and practice is suffused with emotion.  
Descriptively, the death decision is an emotional decision through and 
through. 
II. JUSTIFYING EMOTIONAL JUSTICE 
Emotions may in fact pervade the law, but does that make them right?  
Is our law just a jumble of backward, vengeful impulses, ones on which we 
as a civilized society should turn our backs?  Are emotions—particularly 
punitive emotions—downright primitive and bestial? 
On the contrary, punitive emotions deserve our respect, as a central 
part of what makes us human.  When a wild animal threatens us, we do not 
judge or condemn it.  We may incapacitate it or scare it off, but it is ludi-
crous to be angry at a shark or a tree for killing someone.  Animals, plants, 
and objects are not moral agents.  The same holds for very young children 
and truly insane adults.27 
We are angry at moral agents because we acknowledge that they had 
the freedom to choose and chose wrongly.  Anger recognizes and respects 
their freedom, holding them accountable for their choices.  Our anger re-
flects our care for our victimized fellow man and our outrage at the criminal 
who should have known better.  Anger underscores the moral community 
we share with victims and criminals.28  Crimes have torn the social fabric 
and demand justice, payback to condemn the crime, vindicate the victim, 
and denounce the wrongdoer.  Where there is no anger, there is no justice 
and no sense of community.  Grave moral wrongs demand righteous indig-
nation and action.  Executing Adolf Eichmann was hardly necessary to in-
capacitate or deter him, but it was essential to condemn the Holocaust and 
vindicate its victims. 
Given emotion’s deep roots in the law, trying to uproot it may not only 
be futile, but dangerous.  Punishment channels retributive anger, limiting it 
to proportional payback and tempering it with neutral adjudicators and pun-
ishers.  If one squelches the impulse rather than channeling it, people may 
take the law into their own hands.  That is the message, for example, of 
John Grisham’s A Time to Kill: if the justice system does not offer a fair 
hope of justice, the victim’s father may kill the perpetrators himself.29 
 
26
  See 2001 Guidance to United States Attorneys in Clemency Matters § 1–2.112(3), reprinted in 13 
FED. SENT’G REP. 195 (2001) (suggesting, however, that absence of remorse should not entirely pre-
clude clemency). 
27
  Here we are discussing moral agency in the context of free will, blame, and responsibility for 
one’s actions.  Broader considerations of human dignity protect children, the mentally ill, and others 
from being victimized, even though they are not fully responsible for their actions. 
28
  Walter Berns, For Capital Punishment: The Morality of Anger, HARPER’S, Apr. 1979, at 15. 
29
  Cf. JOHN GRISHAM, A TIME TO KILL (2004).  Note that in the book, the father killed his daugh-
ter’s assailants because he feared they would not be punished.  Of course, outside of fiction child rapists 
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Moreover, efforts to distance the death penalty from its emotional roots 
can produce a distorting cognitive dissonance.  Modern litigation over lethal 
injection protocols reflects deep ambivalence about the emotions behind the 
death penalty.30  The quest for painless execution methods is quixotic: 
States seek to inflict the ultimate violence while avoiding needless suffer-
ing.  The offender deserves to suffer, yet we simultaneously want to see jus-
tice done and avert our eyes from it. 
In recent decades, many psychologists have embraced the concept of 
emotional intelligence to help explain why traditional definitions of intelli-
gence are lacking.31  Legal scholars need to make a similar move when ex-
amining capital punishment.  Only by raising our emotional IQ can we 
better understand the remarkable persistence of the death penalty in Amer-
ica. 
III. EXECUTING CHILD RAPISTS? 
Even if the death penalty is emotionally appropriate for the worst mur-
ders, that does not resolve Patrick Kennedy’s case.  Aren’t murders qualita-
tively far worse than rapes?  Shouldn’t the worst penalty be reserved for the 
worst, most outrageous crime of all?  But a strict ranking of murder as 
eclipsing all rapes, even child rapes, is emotionally tone deaf.  In our view, 
child rape may present an even stronger emotional case for capital punish-
ment than the ordinary murder, for at least two reasons. 
First, the direct victim of a murder is dead.  The victim of a rape almost 
always survives and must deal for the rest of her lifetime with the emotional 
scars this crime leaves behind.32 Child rape in particular targets a defense-
less victim, who often has been violated by a relative or trusted authority 
figure, as with Patrick Kennedy’s stepdaughter.  Observers understandably 
empathize with her wounded innocence and rage at his brutal breach of pa-
ternal trust. 
Moreover, in the horrific universe of child rape, many survivors will 
bear grievous scars.  A recent article highlighted the emotional scars of 
children who are raped and exploited by child pornographers:  
                                                                                                                           
normally receive some punishment, though perhaps not as much as the populace would like.  Thus, the 
fear of vigilantism is not as great in modern America as it is in fiction. 
30
  See Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520 (2008) (note the fractured Supreme Court opinions, reflecting 
the Court’s own ambivalence about pain in executions). 
31
  See, e.g., DANIEL GOLEMAN, EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE: WHY IT CAN MATTER MORE THAN IQ 
(2006).  
32
  The Supreme Court emphasized this point in the course of banning capital punishment for the 
rape of an adult in Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 598 (1977): “Life is over for the victim of the mur-
derer; for the rape victim, life may not be nearly so happy as it was, but it is not over and normally is not 
beyond repair.”  To our modern ears, this sentence seems quite emotionally insensitive; it fails to recog-
nize how badly rape can scar its victims.  It is especially dated in light of modern research on the social 
and personal impact of sexual violations.  See, e.g., NAT’L CTR. FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME & CRIME 
VICTIMS RESEARCH & TREATMENT CTR., RAPE IN AMERICA: A REPORT TO THE NATION 7–8 (1992).  
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They are real children sometimes snatched from real streets in real neighbor-
hoods both in the U.S. and abroad. . . .  Sometimes, these children are being 
victimized by those they once held dear, Knoxville FBI Supervisory Agent 
Rob Root noted. 
“A lot of times it’s familial relationships,” Root said. “Sometimes it’s 
neighbors.  It’s someone who has an ability to have contact with these children 
in private.” 
U.S. Attorney Russ Dedrick added, “A lot of these kids are just ruined for the 
rest of their lives.”33 
These child rape victims may have their horrifying treatment captured 
on film and then peddled around the world.  They will spend their lives not 
only grappling with the anguish of rape, but fearing that any computer 
could replay their childhood horror.  No punishment can erase that pain, but 
capital punishment is at least a fitting response because it is so solemn, se-
vere, and final.  The death penalty unequivocally proclaims society’s empa-
thy and outrage, that these victims bear no blame and need never fear that 
their abusers will repeat or keep exploiting their trauma. 
Second, the innocent parents of the rape victim, and other parents, may 
feel unique emotional harm from the sexual violation of children.  Precisely 
because children are innocent and defenseless, adults feel special affection 
and solicitude and responsibility toward them.  We are to protect them, so 
any exploitation—especially sexual violation—outrages that trust.  De-
nouncing and punishing that violation in the strongest possible terms repu-
diates the breach of trust and tries to repair it.  It is all we can do to 
vindicate the wounded, suffering victim.  Hence the father’s natural impulse 
to kill the rapists of his ten-year-old daughter, and the jury’s willingness to 
acquit him by reason of insanity, in A Time to Kill. 
Disappointingly, much of the modern debate over capital child rape 
does not even acknowledge, let alone confront, the extraordinary emotional 
freight of every child rape.  Of course, only the most heinous child rapes 
will deserve the death penalty, just as very few murders are thought to jus-
tify the ultimate punishment.  But legislators, prosecutors, and juries are 
well equipped to decide which child rapes are so heinous as to call for the 
ultimate punishment.  While judges should of course review these deci-
sions, they should at the same time respect other actors’ efforts to express 
society’s outrage. 
IV. EMOTIONALLY OPPOSING DEATH 
Our argument is not that the modern administration of the death pen-
alty is completely fine or that emotion always justifies society’s ultimate 
 
33
  Jamie Satterfield, Hunting Predators, KNOXVILLE NEWS (Tenn.), May 18, 2008, at A14, avail-
able at http://www.knoxnews.com/news/2008/may/18/hunting-predators/ (link). 
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sanction.  Capital punishment in America has many shortcomings, ranging 
from the evidentiary flaws exposed by innocence commissions to obvious 
race, sex, and wealth imbalances in its application.  But those who oppose 
the death penalty need to stop simply reciting bloodless arguments about 
cost and deterrence in order to engage in rich emotional dialogue. 
Indeed, the best capital defense attorneys already do this.  When argu-
ing to juries, they use mitigation experts to humanize defendants and get ju-
rors to empathize with them and their often limited capacities.  They work 
to evoke and highlight their clients’ remorse and apologies.  They counter 
the emotional language of justice with the equally emotional language of 
mercy.34 
The most persuasive opponents of the death penalty neither deny the 
power of outrage nor demonize supporters as bloodthirsty animals.  Rather, 
they persuade jurors who are open to the death penalty that the most authen-
tic emotional response to this defendant is to feel at least a little pity, just 
enough to spare his life.  This tactic works often enough with juries.  Per-
haps it is time to conduct more of the public-policy debates on this terrain 
as well. 
Indeed, the modern political debate over the death penalty has been 
transformed not by new data about racial disparities or deterrence, but by 
concerns about convicting the innocent.  Wrongful conviction is not unique 
to the death penalty, and evidentiary reforms attack the problem more di-
rectly than can punishment rules.  Moreover, the actual percentage of 
wrongful executions is likely quite small.  Nevertheless, because just the 
possibility of a wrongful execution has so much emotional resonance, that 
fear has fueled significant capital-punishment reforms.35  Though costs and 
racial skews may animate criminal-justice reformers, emotional politicians 
and voters will be drawn to stories of individual capital cases gone wrong. 
Reflecting again on the Kennedy case, the strongest policy argument 
against capital child-rape laws may be the particularly great worry about 
wrongful convictions.  Rapes are often challenging to prosecute, and that is 
doubly true of cases depending on young child witnesses, who may have 
shaky memories and verbal skills.  Hysteria over monsters in our midst can 
distract prosecutors and jurors from carefully judging guilt.  Rather than re-
sisting the emotional case for executing child rapists, opponents should de-
velop their own emotional case for minimizing wrongful executions. 
 
34
  See Anthony V. Alfieri, Mitigation, Mercy, and Delay: The Moral Politics of Death Penalty Abo-
litionists, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 325, 331–33 (1996) (noting, however, that this strategy does not 
always succeed).   
35
  See generally Lawrence C. Marshall, The Innocence Revolution and the Death Penalty, 1 OHIO 
ST. J. CRIM. L. 573 (2004). 
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CONCLUSION 
Emotions can evolve and be informed.  Some opponents contend that 
capital-child-rape laws will harm child-rape victims and their families.  If 
so, this harm will undercut the sympathy and empathy that drive these laws, 
leading legislators to pull back.  As our discussion highlights, democratic 
processes engage capital emotions effectively in deciding which crimes are 
eligible for the death penalty.  Thus, unelected judges should be wary of sti-
fling a healthy, democratic national dialogue that can air and develop capi-
tal emotions. 
Cool, somber courtrooms can seem hostile to emotional expression.  
But, especially in criminal justice, we must neither forget nor disdain seeth-
ing passion.  Especially where those passions are most intense, in capital 
cases, lawyers and scholars ought to combine doctrinal analysis with sensi-
tivity to emotion. 
 
 
